Updated for Kent Wells McBriefing: Adm. Allen just finished his morning briefing by telling everyone that, even though the BOP is leaking, BP is going ahead with the "injectivity test" prior to pumping the top kill. I guess in BPworld, pumping on a damaged and leaking wellhead, likely exceeding rated pressures for some of the components in that wellhead, somehow lowers risk. I have now been listening to both BP and government representatives for 2 weeks explaining the static kill, and have yet to hear an intelligent, cogent argument for why they're doing this. In the meantime, the relief well, which could have easily been finished by now, sits on standby, circulating mud hour on hour, day after day, only needing to drill another 100 feet vertically. They are right there, waiting for the next tropical storm to head their way, I guess.
So, let me be sure I understand...BP is getting ready to pump heavy mud below a precariously mounted "capping stack", on top of a damaged riser connector and flex joint, through a badly damaged blowout preventer that has partially closed rams, 2 lengths of 5 1/2" drill pipe, a damaged 9 7/8" liner hanger and packoff all stuck in it. They're then going to pump down the the inside of the damaged 16" intermediate pipe, down the outside of the 9/7/8 x 7" long string 13,000 feet to open hole of unknown size, then through 600 feet of known loss circulation zones. During all of this procedure, somehow, BP's engineers will be able to discern whether they are going down the outside or inside of the casing by monitoring pressure, rates, and "sonic" waves as I understand the Admiral to say. Now, to be clear, in order for them to get down the inside of the long string casing that the Admiral talked about today, they will have to pump past through the damaged hanger and packoff, past 3,000 feet of partially crushed drill pipe as well as past another piece of unknown length, all of which is stuck in the partially closed blowout preventer, down 13,000 of pipe, then through cement on top of two wiper plugs, through a closed float collar, then down 134 feet of cement filled shoe track, through a guide shoe, and out of the pipe, back up through whatever cement is on the outside of the pipe into the formation which is above the shoe, killing the well. Got it. No risk there.
Was this Kabuki play all designed to keep from flowing the well and measuring the volume? It certainly seems so. Even keeping the well shut in, which I think contains enough risk in itself, is far less risky than this procedure carries. Clearly, something else is going on in BPworld. What's really frustrating is that the press has gotten so cozy during these daily seances that reporters are now asking no more difficult questions than clarifying time lines or asking why the oil is "disappearing" from the water rather than asking exactly what the hell it is they are doing and why. One really good question to ask is, "Of the 40 successful relief wells that John Wright (who is supervising the relief well here) has drilled, how many times did he need to do a "static kill" first?" I would really like to know the answer to that one.
Hopefully, this procedure, whatever it is, will work. I'm not sure if we'll even know what success is, short of some big leak we can see on the ROV feeds. The risk here, looking in from the outside, seems excessive. Especially since the relief well, the only real solution, even acknowledged by the Admiral today, is so close, yet so far.
More on The Daily Hurricane Energy page.
Update: Fishgrease, one of my pals over at Daily Kos' Gulf Watchers, just sent me this pic:
Looks like we were more right than we realized. The leak is coming from the old BOP. We'll be watching.
So, let me be sure I understand...BP is getting ready to pump heavy mud below a precariously mounted "capping stack", on top of a damaged riser connector and flex joint, through a badly damaged blowout preventer that has partially closed rams, 2 lengths of 5 1/2" drill pipe, a damaged 9 7/8" liner hanger and packoff all stuck in it. They're then going to pump down the the inside of the damaged 16" intermediate pipe, down the outside of the 9/7/8 x 7" long string 13,000 feet to open hole of unknown size, then through 600 feet of known loss circulation zones. During all of this procedure, somehow, BP's engineers will be able to discern whether they are going down the outside or inside of the casing by monitoring pressure, rates, and "sonic" waves as I understand the Admiral to say. Now, to be clear, in order for them to get down the inside of the long string casing that the Admiral talked about today, they will have to pump past through the damaged hanger and packoff, past 3,000 feet of partially crushed drill pipe as well as past another piece of unknown length, all of which is stuck in the partially closed blowout preventer, down 13,000 of pipe, then through cement on top of two wiper plugs, through a closed float collar, then down 134 feet of cement filled shoe track, through a guide shoe, and out of the pipe, back up through whatever cement is on the outside of the pipe into the formation which is above the shoe, killing the well. Got it. No risk there.
Was this Kabuki play all designed to keep from flowing the well and measuring the volume? It certainly seems so. Even keeping the well shut in, which I think contains enough risk in itself, is far less risky than this procedure carries. Clearly, something else is going on in BPworld. What's really frustrating is that the press has gotten so cozy during these daily seances that reporters are now asking no more difficult questions than clarifying time lines or asking why the oil is "disappearing" from the water rather than asking exactly what the hell it is they are doing and why. One really good question to ask is, "Of the 40 successful relief wells that John Wright (who is supervising the relief well here) has drilled, how many times did he need to do a "static kill" first?" I would really like to know the answer to that one.
Hopefully, this procedure, whatever it is, will work. I'm not sure if we'll even know what success is, short of some big leak we can see on the ROV feeds. The risk here, looking in from the outside, seems excessive. Especially since the relief well, the only real solution, even acknowledged by the Admiral today, is so close, yet so far.
More on The Daily Hurricane Energy page.
Update: Fishgrease, one of my pals over at Daily Kos' Gulf Watchers, just sent me this pic:
Looks like we were more right than we realized. The leak is coming from the old BOP. We'll be watching.Update 2: I just finished listening to Kent Wells technical McBriefing, where no technical data was given and where he stayed a few minutes to take 3 irrelevant questions plus one irrelevant bonus question from the press. The short summary is that, "everything is going according to plan." He said the injectivity test went fine, gave no pressures, no rates, no volumes, and didn't explain the clouds of mud and whatever that were blowing all over the place on 4 ROV feeds (including the one above that was taken by TomTech over at Daily Kos). He said they were pumping mud and will be making the decision about cement at a later point. That was it. Click.
Sounds like you have some inside information not generally available, but I have to disagree with you on erosion of the shear rams that were out in the stream for over 70 days. Though the shear ram seals are on the back of the block, certainly the erosion plus mechanical damage would compromise the entire assembly at least some. With a well making a lot of sand, which this one surely was, erosion would be severe on that and any other partially closed ram. If they could have, I would have thought they would have tried to drop the 5 1/2 fish long before trying to kill. Second fish, which was probably just sitting on the partially closed ram, could complicate that whole operation. All of this assumes that the casing hanger and even some of the casing are not up in the BOP. Also, we don't know if the 9 7/8 is collapsed. It being Q125 62.8#, it's collapse is rated at 11,140. That much differential at the hanger? Maybe, but not likely. Depends on specifics of displacing the riser, where they were displacing, and was the lower hydril really still closed as reported in testimony by the subsea supervisor.
Doubt seriously that they will remove capping stack or old BOP until relief well complete.
With the bore full of mud, dropping the now sheared off string by cycling the shear ram could allow full sealing of the BOP since shear rams would not be eroded from 78 days of uncontrolled flow. Sure, dropping such a large "fish" could swab the bore, possibly causing renewed flow but they had control before the static kill.
Gamma source radiography did not show any pressure integrity damage to this ram, the seals on the VBRs and sequential pipe rams excluded. Because the shear ram seals are not affected by erosion and the shear ram had not fully closed, they can rely on it to seal.
By closing the BOP fully, the capping stack can be removed, increasing security with reliance on the BOP alone.
Thank you for answering my question regarding recovery of BOP. BP has been so untrustworthy that I was beggining to think they were burying the truth-literally.
All true and you are correct about the venting of the open side of the circuit during energizing from one side or the other. It would be surprising, though, for them to cycle any of the rams in the old BOP, especially with the damage.
The picture of the BOP "leaking" is venting glycol. The rams are actuated by hydraulics which use glycol as the working fluid. This is biodegradable, used because of the very high pressures (10,000 PSI) as regular hydraulic oils have lower compressive moduli.
BOPs and many of the subsea hydraulics are open-circuit, running off of accumulators. This is done for speed of actuation, a return to the surface would inhibit ram actuation. Dumping to the ocean eliminates flow drag.
It is not oil or drilling fluid. Castrol Transaqua HT is one example. Most have UV dyes for detection of leaks, the metal halide lights will cause some fluorescence, this is what you see.
The BOP can be disconnected even if there is cement in the bore. Cementing is weighted to reach the bottom through the addition of hematite (a type of iron ore) or barite (barium sulfate). Once the pumping of cement stops, a flush of drilling mud cleans the bore, forcing any cement out. The cement does not have any appreciable tensile strength.
As far as the tilt, this was only in the flex joint of the LMRP. This flex joint was stabilized by jacks prior to the landing of the capping stack BOP on the transition spool.
Bottom hole pore pressure which is also formation pressure was 13.9 ppg. This corresponds to about 13.2 ksi
The relief well will never be used for any production. It is a specific purpose well.
Thanks for your comments.
Regarding the first point, what mud weight was required to contain the reservoir pressure from the deepest pay zone when the well was initially drilled?
1. This is the first well, there is no other.
2. No. See above.
3. Yes, the well kicked them for weeks.
4. Possible. If it took 16 lb mud to kill it, that's about 15k
Unanswered questions:
1. When drilling the original well, what mud weight was required to contain the reservoir pressure in the deepest pay zone? I heard 16.8 pounds per gallon drilling mud. Is that correct?
2. I also heard that the original well was drilled past the bottom of the deepest pay zone and then lost circulation. Is that correct?
3. I also heard that there are two other pay zones above the bottom one which has the high pressure. Is that correct?
4. Why does no one ask or answer questions about the original bottom-hole reservoir pressure? I have heard speculation that it is on the order of 12,000 psi, but that seems low and unable to account for the resulting blowout and scale of the oil spill. Could it be on the order of 15,000 psi?
Looks like they are holding off on the relief well, so they can use it later as a production well. They must be very confident that if the static kill causes another blowout, the relief well will kill it before the new oil causes intolerable damages. The big worry is a series of storms, which might keep them from finishing the relief well for weeks.
Seems like the Admiral doesn't have an engineer on his staff. Have you tried contacting Secretary Salazar or Secretary Chu?
Fear For The Gulf
And of BP's "expertise"
How many relief wells has Wells ever dug?
These two in the Gulf may well be his first.
Is that why Bob Dudley's escaping to Russia?
Should BlackRock investors be expecting the worst?
Wells once said relief wells were the only sure way
Of plugging their bad well to be sure it stays plugged.
But now Kent's suggesting that perhaps they won't need to.
Are they taught at BP that we'd all be drugged
By a partial success in capping the well
So they needn't keep spending on drilling relief,
Where they're using the same model blowout preventer
Just to cut corners but risk causing more grief,
Perhaps not tomorrow but some time in the future?
Their cap's not that tight which they won't let us see,
And who's sure their annulus can withstand more pressure?
Please tell us we won't let these birds off scot-free.
Bob Carlson
www.politicalboondoggles.com
8/3/10
To 'Static Kill Procedure Starting - Even with BOP Leaks'
To 'BP begins 'static kill' of Deepwater Horizon well'
To 'BP admits top kill mud was toxic:
Tony Hayward Senate testimony might be perjury '
To 'Documents indicate heavy use of dispersants in Gulf oil spill'
To 'Annulus (oil well) definition'
To 'BP Oil Spill Settlements Offered
To Avoid Lawsuite For More Compensation'
To 'British Petroleum Incompetence'
Dear Bob,
I sent some of your comments to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/08/03/bp-static-kill-oil.html)
with the request that they ask Admiral Allen or BP why they aren't finishing the relief well as a matter of priority. I suggested this was important because the head of BP Canada recently was making the case to the Canadian government that it shouldn't have to show it can drill a same-season relief well in the Arctic Archipelago, the failure of a blow-out preventer being so very unlikely, an act of God, really.
WE don't need no engineers; we know ever'thang !
if the BOP doesn't do like the turbine in " China Syndrome " we'll need to find out the exact person who over-engineered something in this country and give her/him a medal !
still want to know how 5 stories of 450-tons leaning at 10-11 degrees (per Adm. Allen) gets another 75 tons added to it and hasn't tilted over.
Can somebody tell me how the BOP is going to be brought up and inspected after it is filled with cement essentially cementing it to the floor of the gulf?
Where are we now? Is it that we need competent engineering or divine intervention? I am praying for the latter.
Man , if this goes horibly wrong , Allen will have absolute heck to pay. USCG has followed BP apparent marching orders or looked the other way when : BP has decided to diregard dispersant instructtions from the EPA ; when BP came up with the well intergrity test and opted to cap the well rather than run oil and gas to the surface ; now BP is angling to kill the well by the static kill and appears to wish to blow off the relief well option. BP better be rightor all heck will break loose if this goes poorly and damages the well bore.
looks like the A-team is still on vacation or just AWOL; who are the consulting engineers and what the --- !