I'm listening to Kent Wells morning "technical briefing" just as he is announcing that the much discussed well integrity test has still not begun. They are repairing a leak in the choke line from the capping stack that showed up as soon as they started the procedure yesterday evening. They are venting oil from the kill line on the new stack, and sometime last night resumed recovering oil through the choke and kill lines on the old BOP stack. We are now on day six of this capping stack procedure, day 3 of the "well integrity test", whatever that is.
I still have grave concerns about this testing procedure; aside from the tens of thousands of barrels roaring into the Gulf unabated, they are taking huge risk in further damage to the well undertaking an operation whose objectives are still not clear. Yesterday in his briefing, Adm Allen said they were looking for 8,000 to 9,000 psi, and described that result as being "good". During that same briefing, he also said, "I was gung-ho for this test and I remain gung-ho for this test." How comforting.
Since the well is most likely flowing up the backside of the 9 7/8 x 7" production casing, there is about 1,200 feet of open hole between TD (bottom of the well) and the shoe of the 9 7/8" liner at about 17,100 feet. In addition, they have obvious casing damage above that, caused by the blowout, the top kill, or probably both. In addition, the old BOP and it's components are badly damaged. We found out yesterday from a reader that the flex joint, that we expressed concern about yesterday, is likely an Oil States Model 5, with an MWP (maximum working pressure) of 5,000 psi. One of the cardinal rules of the oilfield is that you never, never, exceed the rated pressures of the vessels, valves, or piping that you are using, even though there is tolerance built into these components. In this particular component, since it is designed to actually flex, Oil States puts a caveat in their specs pointing out the the MWP is reduced as lateral pressure and rotational forces are placed upon it. There has been plenty of that, since it survived the forces of 5,000 feet of riser sinking while tied to it. I called the Unified Command press office with the specific question about this component over 2 days ago. My call was not returned, nor my question answered.
Perhaps one of the most disturbing parts of this whole folly is the shut down of the relief well being drilled by the DDIII that is within only 34' of it's next casing point, and within 200' of communicating with the blowout well, providing an opportunity to kill it for good. They have pulled the drill string back up into the last casing and they they are just sitting there circulating.
This whole procedure is baffling to me. In the oil and gas business, you always mitigate risk. You never undertake an operation that introduces more risk. You never intentionally put more stress on equipment than for which it is designed. If you know you have damage, or an uncertain condition, you don't risk making it worse. You mitigate risk while trying to correct the condition. I seems that BP, with the blessing of the US government, is doing just the opposite.
I still have grave concerns about this testing procedure; aside from the tens of thousands of barrels roaring into the Gulf unabated, they are taking huge risk in further damage to the well undertaking an operation whose objectives are still not clear. Yesterday in his briefing, Adm Allen said they were looking for 8,000 to 9,000 psi, and described that result as being "good". During that same briefing, he also said, "I was gung-ho for this test and I remain gung-ho for this test." How comforting.
Since the well is most likely flowing up the backside of the 9 7/8 x 7" production casing, there is about 1,200 feet of open hole between TD (bottom of the well) and the shoe of the 9 7/8" liner at about 17,100 feet. In addition, they have obvious casing damage above that, caused by the blowout, the top kill, or probably both. In addition, the old BOP and it's components are badly damaged. We found out yesterday from a reader that the flex joint, that we expressed concern about yesterday, is likely an Oil States Model 5, with an MWP (maximum working pressure) of 5,000 psi. One of the cardinal rules of the oilfield is that you never, never, exceed the rated pressures of the vessels, valves, or piping that you are using, even though there is tolerance built into these components. In this particular component, since it is designed to actually flex, Oil States puts a caveat in their specs pointing out the the MWP is reduced as lateral pressure and rotational forces are placed upon it. There has been plenty of that, since it survived the forces of 5,000 feet of riser sinking while tied to it. I called the Unified Command press office with the specific question about this component over 2 days ago. My call was not returned, nor my question answered.
Perhaps one of the most disturbing parts of this whole folly is the shut down of the relief well being drilled by the DDIII that is within only 34' of it's next casing point, and within 200' of communicating with the blowout well, providing an opportunity to kill it for good. They have pulled the drill string back up into the last casing and they they are just sitting there circulating.
This whole procedure is baffling to me. In the oil and gas business, you always mitigate risk. You never undertake an operation that introduces more risk. You never intentionally put more stress on equipment than for which it is designed. If you know you have damage, or an uncertain condition, you don't risk making it worse. You mitigate risk while trying to correct the condition. I seems that BP, with the blessing of the US government, is doing just the opposite.
Bob. I don't know how they would do it with components like flex joints. In the case of downhole electronics in logging sondes, there are no purpose-built "hot hole tools". If you need a tool for a hot hole, you keep trying regular tools in an oven until one doesn't burn up at 400 deg F. That's the tool they use. Maybe they did the same thing with the flex joint? Tested it in a tank at the higher pressure?
I saw the Shell presentation at the Aspen conference. Can somebody tell me if this is accurate? And, does this mean the likelihood of failure is reduced from 45% to 35%, or is the Shell approach really an order of magnitude different? See this link for he Shell presentation: http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/bp-shell-and-the-design-of-deep-wells/
eljefe - good on Hardball tonite; let's all hope things hold !
here's Shell's presentaion on Shell vs. BP deep water drilling:
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/bp-shell-and-the-design-of-deep-wells/?ref=energy-environment
very nice.
The problem is that BP holds all the cards. Like now. Why are they showing pressure feeds? The pressers are shallow, with only major names being allowed to ask questions like "Is Secretary Chu doing a good job?" while no one asks what the pressure on the damn well is. One one question is allowed, no follow ups, and the BP guys swat down anyone who asks a meaningful question.
I believe you miss one probable choice that BP and the Goverment are trying to put out there by doing the well integrity test and also stopping the relief well effort. Why KILL a good well? If all tests show that the well is OK, why kill it!!
Revenues from the well can be used to clean up the oil spill and suport the fishermen till the Gulf returns to "Normal"
After reading your missive with interest and a related piece ( quoting Bob ) at the Daily Kos , a few observations. First , one must consider they scrutized the latest cap every way from Monday through Sunday prior to installing it - yet almost immediately after starting the test last night , there was the choke line leak , which took until the wee hours of this morn to fix. Did they not anticipate where the weak links would be in advance ? Second , under what circumstance could they achieve 8000 - 9000 psi without wrecking the weak link noted in your article , the 5000 psi rated flex joint - as one must assume they know this , why design a test which must fail if one actually attempts to hit the desired psi level ? Third , similar to your experience of being ignored with pertinent but probably inconvenient questions , BP to date has ignored / redirected the efforts of Congressman Markey to obtain critical data concerning the integrity of the relevant structures and seabed in the vicinity of the BOP - which the coast Guard apparently has been given by BP but USCG hasn't shared this data to date with Markey's Office . One must wonder what are they hiding ? Finally , considering the attitude and actions of BP from the onset and the strange acquiescence of the Federal Government , absent brief moments of posturing , one must wonder where the loyalty of the relevant governmental players truly lies - it sure doesn't seem to be with the citizens along the Gulf Coast.
Evidence:
The photo you're looking at is one of the control panels for the new capping stack. The flex joint, ABOVE the old stack and under the new stack, is a 5k connection. It doesn't have a control panel. It's passive and just sits there. Oil States doesn't even make a 15k flex joint, and since it is ON TOP of 15k rams and 10k annulars, it wouldn't even make sense for it to be a higher rating than something below it.
I'm still having a hard time believing that *any* sensible calculation would show the per barrel cost to BP less when released at the bottom, compared to any fines or other cost at the top.
I put this question to the "experts" on The Oil Drum, and the response I got was that they simply don't have enough capacity to process it all at the top. I suggested that they burn it. The response was "impractical". The fire would be too hot, their aren't enough flares available, there would be problems running pipe to a flare at a safe distance, etc. etc.
We need a forum where we can engage these folks, ask follow-on questions, and preserve their answers for all to see. The Oil Drum is no good, because the signal-to-noise ratio is too low, and the threads are closed before I can post a follow-on question.
I suggest we use Google groups for extended discussions, with graphics and other files to support the discussion, and a nice interface to keep the topics organized. See http://groups.google.com/group/stop_blowout.
Because the image seems to show its rated to 15k not 5.
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=6127592&posted=1#post6127592
I don't know either, but if it were me deciding, I would go ahead and hook up the pipes to the collection vessels and be gathering up this oil in the mean time while this other "shutting in" process is worked out. What could be a disadvantage to this, unless they never planned to hook the thing up in the first place?
Maybe there is some kind of problem with this collection system they are not talking about. Or maybe it has to do with royalties they would have to pay on the collected oil. Is it cheaper to let the thing leak and pay the fine than it is to collect the oil?
Or as you suggest, maybe they don't want anybody to know exactly how much oil has been flowing. What is the advantage of wasting time on this test if you are going to be connecting this new stack to a collection system anyway?
Bob, thanks for your excellent coverage.
I don't think they actually plan to seal the well - because they know that would cause other damage as you describe. I think they are just buying time - doing anything they can do to avoid measuring the full flow rate or hoping to reduce the flow a bit before being forced to measure the flow rate. Then, they will go back to work on the relief well.
It's amazing the Obama administration is allowing BP to continue to run the show to this degree ...
BP is still trading pollution for $ and being allowed to do so.
eljefe, I second every point you mention and think the Coast Guard should cough up to Sen. Markey all info they have regarding the hole condition, since BP has not answered Markey's letter.
also, it is concerning the poster mentioned the MWP indicating 5000# was being sanded off or painted (!)
by doing things this way, it seems equipment failure is guaranteed, OR that the object of the test is different than we think/have been told; things seem oriented to detecting sea-bed leaks instead of logical sequence to killing well.
where is the kill plan flow chart/decsion tree ?
looks more & more like the Ixtoc I scenario; is Mexico giving the outside technical advice ?
are things being rushed/compressed due to fear of the weather changing ?