The adaptive approach to missile defense

I still hear from some corners that this administration "abandoned" our allies in Europe by canceling the Ground-based Midcourse Defense silos in Poland and X-band radar site in the Czech Republic proposed by the Bush Administration.  The administration, especially Defense Secretary Gates, makes the argument that they've traded an unproven capability for one that can be deployed sooner and have a real effect on improving European security.

As a former weapons analyst myself, the subject and the popular reaction are both very interesting to me.  Now that I'm in the civilian world, though, and working on space exploration, I have to rely on other analysts with better access to the technical data and my ability to interpret their conclusions.

So, I decided to go out and look for nonpartisan analysis of the new plan.  I first examined a short CBO paper from February on BMD alternatives in Europe, but its assumptions appear to have been overtaken by events.  In particular, the CBO assumed the Navy would buy entirely new ships for BMD operations - an extremely expensive proposition that skewed the cost analysis.  As of now, the Navy is retrofitting existing destroyers in the Atlantic fleet and the money has already been appropriated.

Jenny Shin, of the Center for Defense Information, argues that the "Phased, Adaptive Approach" will actually provide better security and improved cooperation with our European allies.

The GMD system initially proposed was almost entirely geared towards ICBM interception.  As George Friedman of Stratfor also notes, the GMD system would have done little to actually protect Central Europe and Poland, in particular.  It was designed to add another layer of protection for the continental United States.  The Polish were simply counting on us to protect our investment and, thus, protect them against any external threat.

The original system would be wholly inadequate for protecting Poland against any sort of Russian attack and our focus was on Iran, so we in America misinterpreted the Russian complaints.  The GMD interceptors weren't what the Russians were really worried about.  It was the American militarization of a region they consider vital to protecting Russian interests that really concerned them. 

Under the new plan, a combination of fixed and mobile SM-3 interceptors will be deployed on US Navy ships in the region and at land sites to provide our European allies with a defense network against Iranian short-range and medium-range missiles.  Poland will also get the PAC-3 Patriot missile battery originally promised, thus ensuring that the United States continues to have an investment in the country.  The GMD interceptors will actually continue being developed, but will not be actually deployed until their capability is proven and a clear use is identified. 

Shin also points out, and I think this makes sense, that this phased approach better integrates our NATO partners in missile defense.  Remember that an attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against all.  By the United States pursuing a multilateral approach that includes NATO in the missile defense umbrella, Iran would be forced to confront the combined response of the entire NATO system if it were so rash as to launch an attack against US forces and/or allies in Europe.

The New York Times reports that US and Czech officials met this week to begin discussing how to get Czech participation in the phased system.  This comes after Vice President Biden won their support for the plan last month and precedes technical discussions planned for December.  The Polish foreign minister also said last week that Poland is amenable to the new system, so long as it results in his country being included under our protection.

Friedman rightly points out in his article that this still leaves the larger question of how to sort out the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia.  Given the fact that we are honoring our commitment of PAC-3 missiles to Poland and looking at how to integrate them into the new BMD system as well, it doesn't seem to me like we're actually going to turn our backs to them. 

We have few real options in confronting Russian hegemony in the Former Soviet Union while still looking after our own interests, both in Europe and the Middle East.  Bolstering Poland and building up the multilateral European missile shield while being open to recognizing Russian interests elsewhere in the FSU might be the way to do just that.

Cross-posted at A World With No Boundaries.